Introduction
Public issues are regularly decided under considerable uncertainty and it is often difficult to know which available government action is best suited for a particular situation. This is a profound governance problem since flawed designs and inappropriate instruments can produce less than successful policy (Linder and Peters 1988; Linder and Peter 1990; May 2003) . Hence, expert knowledge and advice on advantages and pitfalls of alternatives are often prescribed to decrease policy failures (Howlett and Wellstead 2011; Howlett 2009; Ingold and Gschwend 2014; Öberg et. al 2015) . At the same time, cautions against uncritical acceptance of expert advice recur. For instance, existing information may be ambiguous (Jennings and Hall 2012, 248) , experts may have biased agendas (Mahon and MacBride 2009; Montpetit 2011) , and the use of expertise is often conditional on the political contexts (Boswell 2009a; Weible 2008; Weible et al. 2010 Weible et al. , 2012 . Experts and policy-makers are often aware of and adjust to such influences (Adler and Haas 1992; Dunlop 2009; 303; Lundin and Öberg 2014; Öberg et al. 2015) . Hence, producing advice is not a value-free, purely technical procedure (Fisher and Gottweis 2012) .
For these reasons, normative scholarship on democracy often emphasizes that experts should aid but not dominate debates on public issues (Dahl 1989; Torgerson 1986; Turner 2001) . In policy deliberations, politicians and civil society should use information provided by the experts carefully and critically (Hajer and Wagenaar 2003; Hoppe 2005, 207; Turner 2001; Christiano 2012; Lundin and Öberg 2014) . The literature indicates that deliberative use of expert knowledge is especially complicated when experts are government-appointed, or "certified" (Stallings, 1995; Dunlop, 2014) . Much research on this is still needed. Here, we seek to contribute by investigating whether and how certified experts hamper or facilitate public deliberation over available options for government action.
We examine the role of certified experts and their impact on public deliberation during the pandemic H1N1 influenza in 2009. In response to the pandemic, most mature democracies undertook significant efforts to vaccinate their populations. Public health experts cooperate internationally and share information and scientific discourses. But different countries nevertheless chose divergent vaccination approaches.
Our cases are public debates in advance of the 2009 H1N1 vaccination campaigns in Sweden and Denmark. The countries had markedly different vaccination policies despite close geographic and linguistic proximity. Against the same disease at the same time and with the same vaccine, Sweden sought to inoculate its whole population while Denmark targeted small groups. This makes these cases suitable for exploring theories on expert policy advice and public deliberation. In this context, we answer the following research questions: Did
nationally certified experts explain alternative vaccination options in the public arena? To what extent was more than one option publicly deliberated?
The pandemic flu was worldwide front page news and citizens in many countries felt directly or indirectly affected. In countries with universal health insurance (such as the Nordic) and in many others (such as the US), vaccination policies to treat the flu were associated with public expenditures to fund the program, re-orientation of medicines production, mobilization of medical professionals to administer the drug and active participation by residents to receive it.
For these reasons, we could expect comprehensive explanation of treatment options and deliberation over them.
However, in situations of crises like a pandemic flu, certified experts may monopolize public debate (Haas 1989; Dunlop 2013) . Since professional norms encourage experts to take a consensus position external to and after the scientific discussions (Cross 2013) , alternatives to favored treatments can be ignored or even suppressed. Crises can add to the drive for a common position by encouraging potential critics to stay silent for the sake of timely responses (i.e., they "rally to the flag"). The mechanism may be further strengthened by media"s tendency to distort knowledge by simplifying and stream-lining stories (Parkinson 2006; Boswell 2009b) . Hence, we could expect little or no explanation of alternatives, and effective "freezing" of deliberation.
The findings support the latter, "deliberative freezing" expectations. An extensive investigation of news articles in all major newspapers in Denmark and Sweden indicates that certified experts dominated public discourses in both countries. The respective national pandemic vaccination policy was presented and justified. But although readily observable in neighboring countries, presentation of alternative options was marginal, and little dissent was reported in either country. Hence, each country appeared to have one legitimate vaccination option to counter the pandemic flu crisis, and the truth appeared different to at least one close neighbor.
Expert Policy Advice and Deliberation over Policy Options

Generating and deliberating over alternative policy options
Studies have shown repeatedly that inaccurate policy design affects the implementation and outcome of political decisions negatively and may even worsen the problem that policy makers aim to solve (May 2003) . This is problematic when the level of uncertainty in public policy-making is high. Furthermore, policy-makers may have to act in response to crises, where uncertainty coincides with critical threats and urgency (Rosenthal, Charles, & 't Hart, 1989) . Considering a wide range of policy options reduces the risk of policy failure (Linder and Peters 1988, 740, 748) . Even in cases when scientific support for one option is overwhelming, exploring the risks of alternative options can be useful (Jordan et al. 2013 ).
Hence, although the gains from examining several policy alternatives do not always outweigh the costs of collecting more information, it is generally suboptimal to focus on a single solution to a policy problem (Öberg et al. 2015) .
Critically reflecting on more than one policy option at an early stage is important for several reasons. As emphasized in prior research, it improves the likelihood that preferences and final decisions will be based on facts and logic, and it can produce greater understanding of the problem and its potential solutions (Parkinson and Mansbridge 2012, 11; Barabas 2004; Mansbridge 2003, 524; Hajer and Wagenaar 2003; Lundin and Öberg 2014; Öberg et al. 2015) . Taking several options into account also means that more information on different perspectives will be included, which are key components for democratic accountability (James 2011) and legitimacy (Parkinson and Mansbridge 2012, 10) .
Despite the evidence and arguments for the importance of generating and reflecting on multiple policy options, few studies have focused on alternatives considered during policy formulation (Howlett & Lejano, 2012; James & Jorgensen, 2009; Craft and Howlett 2012; Öberg et al. 2015) . In this paper we focus on the impact of expertise on the range of policy options included in public deliberation. While scholarly interest in expert policy advice has been strong in recent decades, this impact on policy-making is under-researched.
Certified experts and epistemic learning in public policy-making
Reasoned discussion of policy options requires relevant information. Though available information may be contested (Boswell 2009a; Fisher and Gottweis 2012; Lundin and Öberg 2014) , use of expert knowledge reduces the likelihood of policy failure (Lindblom and Woodhouse 1993, 22; Howlett and Wellstead 2011; Landry et al. 2003 , Christiano 2012 . The concept of expert knowledge is in itself contested and often under-specified (Turner 2001) . In this paper, it refers to systematically gathered information that meets standards of coherence and honesty and uses generally accepted research methods (Weible et al. 2012, 11; Lundin and Öberg 2014, 26) . Expert knowledge can be produced at universities, research institutes, consultancies, think tanks, public authorities or other organizations (Weible et al. 2010) . We use the term expert to refer to specialized professionals who primarily base their legitimacy on advanced research in such settings in addition to university training.
Experts rely on legitimation for their status as advisors to an audience (Turner 2001) . Some experts have special status by virtue of government appointments. Appointment means that the polity officially "certifies" that among all professionals specialized in a field, the appointed individuals are particularly qualified to guide policy (Stallings, 1995; Dunlop, 2014) .
Certified experts need not have responsibilities through formal delegation. But they hold titles as experts in government, and sometimes even as a government"s official spokesperson on certain issues (Dunlop 2014, 212) . When gaining status as government officials, experts add the legitimacy of representing the polity (or its interest) to the legitimacy of representing a specialized profession. Utterances by certified experts then have the combined authority of a science and of the state. The privileged position of certified experts in the public debate may be further strengthened by access to state resources, such as those for information dissemination (Weingart 1999) . Conversely, experts outside of the certified group can be hindered from public participation by their lack of official status and resources (Ferretti and Pavone 2009; Dunlop 2014, 216) .
Experts matter because producing policy advice in conditions of uncertainty and technical complexity is extremely demanding, especially in the early policy design stages. In turn, experts commonly belong to epistemic communities, that is, networks of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain (Cross 2013, 142; Dunlop 2013; Haas 1992 ).
In addition, epistemic communities have been identified as "a main vehicle for authoritative consensual knowledge" (Dunlop 2013, 230) and for coping with complex issues.
Through experts, the "consensual knowledge" of epistemic communities can "inform policy choices" (Dunlop 2013, 230) . In a process that Dunlop (2014) has termed "Epistemic Learning", members of epistemic communities use their knowledge to "teach" political leaders and the general public how to solve a collective problem. Two conditions facilitate such learning. First, that the community is closely involved in the bureaucratic machinery, for example, by encompassing certified experts (Dunlop 2013) . Second, that it appears cohesive, because "when a group of professionals with recognized expertise is able to speak with one voice, that voice is often seen as more legitimate because it is based on a well-reasoned consensus among those in the best position to know" (Cross 2013, 147; Dunlop 2013; Haas 1992) . Hence, epistemic learning can generally occur when compatible information is conveyed by all certified experts and others with equal or greater status -the information appears as knowledge. Learning becomes significantly less likely when legitimate experts disagree and convey incompatible messages -their information then resembles opinion.
Even when groups of certified experts are faced with complexity and uncertainty, there are several reasons why they may develop consensus. Actors belonging to an epistemic community by definition already share basic understandings of the world. The process of professionalization tends to establish cohesion of this kind (Cross 2013, 149) . In addition, experts can be strategic actors, and hence, be aware of the strategic importance of consensus (Ingold and Gschwend 2014) . The process of developing consensus may include an adjustment to the political context (Adler and Haas 1992; Dunlop 2009 ). For example, national institutions can shape epistemic communities" policy preferences (Dunlop 2013, 232; Baldwin, 2005; Vallgårda, 2007) .
In sum, when certified experts convey consensus, they can occupy asymmetrical positions as "social instructors" who support epistemic learning, rather than taking more symmetrical positions in public policy formulation where many kinds of actors have sufficient status to offer authoritative inputs (Hoppe, 2005; Dunlop, 2014) . Although there may at some point be differences of opinion among experts, the epistemic processes described previously increase the likelihood that experts will present just one policy option in public.
Media's role in the science-policy nexus
Mass media"s role as mediators of knowledge and opinion is well-known (Boswell 2009b ).
Hence, mass media are crucial arenas for public discourse and deliberation. Despite the substantial presence of experts in media reports, norms and logics differ between experts" own forums and the mass media. Weingart et al (2000) have argued that multiple policy-relevant discourses happen simultaneously and in parallel, with little overlap. In stylized terms, one discourse occurs in the public space, through mass media. Another occurs in the political space, through debates in parliament and among elected and appointed officials. A third occurs in the professional space among scientists and other experts.
Communities of experts have developed media strategies as they have recognized the importance of publicity (Albaeck et al. 2003, 939) . But transmission of arguments and conclusions between discourses is inhibited by dissimilar discourse dynamics. Actors from one discourse may attempt to participate in another. Doing so effectively, or successfully, depends on playing by the rules of the other discourse. Hence, like other actors, experts have to follow the rules that characterize mass media. These rules are defined by "physical limits, organizational features and news values" (Parkinson 2006, 177) . Experts attempting to participate in a public discourse may fail if they
do not adjust what they say to these fundamentals of mass media reporting. Conversely, they may be successful by acting in line with typical mass media"s short column spaces or time-frames (physical limits), focus on person-centered narratives and search for attention-grabbing developments (organizational priorities and news value).
Working with the rules implies ability to exploit them. Even if experts continue to disagree among themselves, the divide between discourses can enable the appearance of consensus. As Weingart et al (2009) suggest, the expert discourse is likely to be inaccessible to non-experts because of high complexity or exclusivity. This enables experts to collude and prevent actual disagreements from coming to public awareness, by presenting a unified front in the public discourse. A unified front plays to the mass media fundamentals. The absence of open conflict or differences of opinion among credible experts is likely to keep actual disputes undiscovered by media searching for attention-grabbing "news". Hence, certified and other experts can maintain the asymmetry of knowledge on which epistemic learning depends.
Admittedly, this is a complicated strategy to implement. But government-appointed experts have additional advantages (Ferretti and Pavone 2009; Dunlop 2014 ) that they can use if necessary. For instance, they can make use media communication resources and strategies that the government possesses. Certified experts can sometimes even control the information flow by organizing government press conferences that set the agenda for national, local or even international media. The discursive gaps and the resources of certified experts thus supplement epistemic communities" own reasons for arriving at consensus (discussed previously).
The possibility of presenting research and policy options in official press conferences does not guarantee that a message will be mediated as intended by experts. "The rules" of public discourse can render mass media unable (rather than unwilling) to accurately or comprehensively report on actual expert opinions. The fundamentals that experts can exploit also mean that media may misrepresent knowledge, such as the conclusions of a scientific discourse (Parkinson, 2006) . A consistent message has some potential to dominate attention; but media may simplify and distort messages before they reach the public (Boswell 2009b ).
In summary, media often use experts to make authoritative claims or pass judgment on other sources. Media is driven by other logics than politics and science. Experts can adapt to media"s logics and effectively prevent disagreements from reaching the public discourse, enabling epistemic learning. Certified experts in particular can make use of government resources for communication and thus have an advantage over other experts and non-experts.
Towards a theory on expert advice and freezing deliberation
As has been argued so far, public deliberation over several policy options is important for legitimacy. It also provides a potential to reduce policy failures. A reasoned discussion presupposes that the participants have access to relevant information. On many complex issues, this means that experts need to supply what information they have on available policy options. Due to the variety of sources, information and expertise in modern society, this can mean that several policy options are discussed in public and that citizens argue or evaluate arguments put forward (Parkinson and Mansbridge 2012, 15) .
There are also mechanisms that may constrain the number of policy options discussed in public. One part of public space, an arena or a community, that may or may not in itself have perfect deliberation, can dominate all the others (Parkinson and Mansbridge 2012, 23) . For example, many fields have dominant epistemic communities. These have professional mechanisms that tend to create consensual positions, and strategic reasons to present a unified front in public debates. In addition, certain experts gain status through government appointment. When not contradicted by other, equally legitimated experts, certified experts are not mere pundits. Media and the general public have no apparent reason to distrust the experts" recommendations. Presenting a unified position can thus make them into policy "instructors". This allows "epistemic policy learning" to occur. The prospects for public deliberation about the actual options available to the polity then become dim. The most legitimate experts" explicit or implicit agreement to present a unified front "freezes" public deliberation.
The "deliberative freezing" mechanisms described here are likely to be strengthened by threats, uncertainties and urgencies typically found in crises (Rosenthal et al. 1989; Ansell et al. 2010 ). In the well-known metaphor, actors in the political system may "rally to the flag" when the polity is faced with such conditions. That is, potential opponents of government policy may suspend their activities in matters related to response to the threat. A key justification for rallying to the flag is to ensure that responses are timely rather than delayed by debate.
A rally to the flag adds a reason for dissenters among experts and non-experts to be unwilling or unable to express their concerns in public about an apparent consensus. As discussed previously, membership in an epistemic community may itself encourage consensus-seeking.
In addition, gaps between discourses and uneven media resources may further dissuade open dissent. Crisis conditions add the prospect that a dissenter can be (made) responsible for creating costly delays in policy (Boswell 2009b) . Similarly, editors and other news media leaders may fear that they will facilitate response delays by reporting on such dissent.
In the remaining part of the paper, we will investigate if these mechanisms made impacts The WHO declaration triggered a global response that lasted through the following winter (2009) (2010) . Many countries took policy action to mitigate the disease. This included all countries in the European Union (EU). Initially, some governments sought to stop the disease at their borders by screening travelers from Mexico and isolating identified cases. One (the UK"s) went so far as to give anti-viral drugs to anyone suspected of having been in touch with an H1N1-infected person. These "containment" measures quickly proved futile, however.
Governments turned to alternatives to mitigate the spread of H1N1.
The core response in most EU countries became vaccination (Mereckiene, et al., 2012) . In anticipation of a pandemic influenza, several countries had in preceding years signed advance purchase agreements (APAs) with pharmaceutical companies that obliged them to order quantities of pandemic flu vaccine in the event that the WHO declared a full ("phase 6") pandemic. It did so on June 11 2009. In the surrounding period, governments across Europe engaged in decision-making about whether and how much vaccine to make available to domestic populations by placing orders with producers.
Countries with APAs were not all confined to specific vaccine quantities. Denmark and Sweden had both negotiated APAs with pharmaceutical producer GSK during 2006 and 2007.
The Danish government was obliged to order 2.3 million doses. But Denmark"s APA guaranteed delivery of up to 4.6 million if it wanted them, and larger orders were feasible in June 2009 (e.g., the Netherlands had no valid APA at that time but was able to order 34 million doses). The Swedish government was obliged to order 9 million doses but was guaranteed up to 18 million doses if it wanted them. Every inoculated person was expected to need two doses. Hence, the Danish government had to choose whether to cover about 21 % of its population or more. The Swedish government had to choose whether to cover about 48 % of its population or more. Denmark decided to purchase enough for 28 %. Sweden opted for 100 % coverage.
During the subsequent summer and fall, governments decided whom to offer vaccination.
Vaccine deliveries began in October, and campaigns kicked off around that time. In advance, countries had selected groups that would be offered vaccination. The Danish government decided to offer vaccination only to specified medical risk groups, health care workers and people deemed critical to vital functions in society (1.1 million people, or apx. 20 % of the population). The Swedish government decided to offer vaccination to everyone (100 % of the population). That is, using the same vaccine against the same disease and at the same time, the countries pursued widely differing core response policies, with different consequences for health care systems and government finances.
Data: Policy Options in Swedish and Danish Print Media
Sweden and Denmark were selected as cases because of their significant language and institutional similarities and their close proximity (i.e., "most similar systems"; Przeworski & Teune, 1970; Peters, 1998) . In addition, because they responded simultaneously and with the same vaccine to the same event, features inherent to the event cannot explain the previously described variations between national H1N1 vaccination policies.
The analysis uses data on policy options mentioned in the public discourse and related Claims were sorted into three general categories:
 Support for general mass vaccination ("all" should be vaccinated).
 Support for targeted or risk-group only vaccination ("some" should be vaccinated).
 Support for no vaccination ("none" should be vaccinated).
The analyses focus primarily on the types of actors that contribute to the discourse (claimmakers). Coding sorted claim-makers into six categories:
 Certified experts are public health experts (physicians, epidemiologists, virologists and other highly trained professionals specializing in health issues, influenza or vaccines), who are civil servants and tasked with public health/pandemic flu management by the national or a local government. 
Quantitative Results
The following analyses focus on the number of claims, what they were, who made them and how they were presented in print media. Rather than having equal mention of alternative claims, each country"s print media were dominated by one claim (Figure 1 ). The dominant claim was consistent with national policy. In Sweden, most attributable claims made in print media about who should receive vaccination (74 %) supported the general mass vaccination policy ("all"). In Denmark, a similar proportion of claims (73 %) supported the targeted vaccination policy ("some"). Claims identified in Swedish print media mostly show expert opinions being conveyed, and on both sides of the argument. As previously described, 107 claims were identified. The texts attributed 58 % of these to certified experts while 15 % were attributed to other experts.
Journalists and civil society each contributed 10 % of claims, politicians 6 % and other civil servants 1%.
The Danish data show a wider range of opinions being conveyed, with experts in plurality but with significant contributions from politicians, citizens and the media itself. 127 claims were identified. The texts attributed 28 % of these to certified experts while 9 % were attributed to other experts. Civil society contributed 27 % of claims, politicians 19 % and journalists 9 %.
Other civil servants contributed 7 %.
Consistent with these aggregate distributions, the composition of claim-makers supporting the government position varied between the countries. In the Swedish media, certified experts made nearly 70 % of claims supporting policy. Other experts made 13 % of such claims.
Journalists made the third-largest contribution at just less than 10 % of supportive claims, and other groups less. In Danish media, certified experts made 35 % of claims supporting policy while other experts made 9 %. Other substantial contributors included civil society at 22 % and politicians at 18 % of claims.
Similarly, the composition of claim-makers opposing the government position differed between the countries. Of the claims printed in national media, 26 % of the Swedish and 27 % of the Danish opposed government policy. In Sweden, the majority of these claims were also by experts: 25 % were from certified experts while 39 % were from other experts. Civil society contributed 25% and journalists 11 % of the claims. No Swedish politician was quoted or cited in the print media as opposing the policy. In Denmark, in contrast, the largest contributor of opposing claims was civil society at 41 %. This was followed by politicians at 21 % and journalists at 18 %. Certified experts made 9 % and other experts 12% of counterpolicy claims.
As seen, opinion was not monolithic in groups contributing to the public discourse as Locations in print media thus show that pro-policy claims relied overwhelmingly on conveyance by reporting. Conveyance of counter-policy claims depended much more on opinion pieces. This suggests that print media tended to frame pro-policy claims as neutral facts. In contrast, counter-policy claims were more prone to framing as more or less respectable opinion. This interpretation is supported by the far greater preponderance of propolicy than counter-policy claims in articles in both countries. In addition, a significant part of the counter-policy claims were expressed in letters to the editors (21% in Sweden, 35% in Denmark). Such pieces may not in general receive attention from readers to the same degree as articles or more "respectable" opinion pieces.
Qualitative Analysis and Discussion
Though claims in each country were evidently skewed in favor of national policy (Figure 1) , the data do not show that debate was entirely absent. Though they tended to be carried as opinion rather than reporting (Figure 3) , an appreciable minority of claims supported alternative policies. Does this indicate public deliberation that weighed the pros and cons of policy alternatives to arrive at the best policy choice for each country, or at least that the situation was far from the effective "freezing" of deliberation as hypothesized in the theory section?
To explore this issue, we analyze whether the minority consisted of claims of higher quality than those in the majority, and whether this quality could conceivably balance out the sheer quantity of pro-policy messages. The focus is placed on the certified and other experts, who were the main contributors to both countries" debates (though admittedly less so in Denmark).
As shown, nearly ¾ of the identified claims in each country supported government policy, while ¼ opposed. In stylized terms, to balance out the weight of the pro-policy stance, counter-policy claims would need to be on average three times "better" than pro-policy claims.
To assess whether counter-policy claims can credibly be said to have reached this threshold, the analysis uses the relative professional or social status of claim-makers. All texts identified in the search present formal titles or other credentials of claim-makers (i.e., their sources).
Hence, the strength of each claim"s legitimacy (public acceptance) is likely to hinge on these reported markers of professional or social status. This makes credentials relevant as gauges of the relative weight of the claims.
Sweden
As described previously, 62 of the 107 Swedish claims were made by certified experts. An overwhelming 55 of these were pro-policy claims. The largest contributors were Anders Tegnell (the head of the infectious diseases division at the National Board of Health and Welfare) and Annika Linde (the State Epidemiologist). Other cited certified experts included the Director-General of the National Board of Health and Welfare, regional public health heads from Stockholm and Göteborg (i.e., Sweden"s major cities), and two leading EU agency health officials who were Swedish nationals (a Chief Scientist and a Director). Only seven counter-policy claims were made by certified experts. Six of these claims were made by district medical officers (distriktsläkare) in a town far to the north of major population and administrative centers. The seventh is a claim by a mathematical modeler at Smittskyddsinstitutet (SMI), who argued that there is no difference between the immunizing effects of vaccinating 70 % and 90 % of a population. While this was a critique of Sweden"s hard push to vaccinate its total population, it was not an outright condemnation of its mass vaccination policy. This suggests that counter-policy claims by certified experts were not made by individuals who enjoyed the status that could balance out the dominating claim made in national print mass media.
At the level of other experts in Sweden, 16 claims were identified. Eleven of these opposed national policy. Three of them were made by a professor at Uppsala University Hospital who argued that mass vaccination was unnecessary and too expensive. However, he was later supportive of national policy, calling on people to seek vaccination for themselves and their children. Two counter-policy claims were attributed to a MD that one newspaper (derogatorily?) labeled "the doctor of fat" ("fettdoktorn"; Aftonbladet, Sep. 5 2009, p. 12) .
She implicitly argued against any vaccination by claiming that adopting a fatty diet would protect people against H1N1. She added that the government was allowing too much mercury in the vaccine and was being influenced by pharmaceutical companies. One other counterpolicy claim was attributed to a former professor of infectious diseases at the Karolinska Institute, who advocated a more targeted program. The remaining counter-policy claims were attributed to e.g. an unnamed group of American scientists, a pediatrician, a psychiatrist, and a molecular biologist.
As in the case of certified experts, the counter-policy claims of other experts do not credibly balance out the pro-policy expert claims. Most are cited just once in the body of national print coverage. The most cited specialist changed or nuanced his opinion to favor policy, and hence, may have neutralized his own impact. Others were clearly on the fringes of the medical establishment or non-specialist, and hence, relatively marginal.
It is thus implausible that the relative "weight" of the counter-policy claims by experts made up for the number of pro-policy expert claims. Moreover, the opponents of the national policy were divided between favoring targeted and no vaccination. This suggests that the weight of pro-policy expert opinion in Sweden was more rather than less overwhelming than indicated by the claim quantities alone. That is, the evidence does not contradict that Sweden"s most legitimate experts were portrayed as unified in the judgment that all people should be vaccinated against H1N1. There are good reasons to believe that citizens received the impression that only one option, mass vaccination, was to be seriously considered. Twelve claims were made by other experts. Several leading national specialists argued for the national policy, including professors of influenza epidemiology, children"s diseases, experimental virology, and internal medicine. In return, four claims were made against policy.
Two of these were attributed to a professor of health economics that used economic reasoning to argue for general mass vaccination. The other two were made by a Swedish expert (a MD who headed the Swedish local government association"s health care division), and a domestic MD that voiced opposition to any vaccination.
Like their Swedish counterparts, residents in Denmark were thus likely to receive the impression that only one policy option was feasible. Recall that counter-policy claims were prevalent in letters to the editor and other opinion pieces rather than in reporting. In addition, the relative status of claim-makers renders implausible that the "weight" of the counter-policy claims by experts in Danish print media made up for the number and placement of pro-policy expert claims. As described, three of the seven counter-policy claims were sourced to experts authorized in Sweden rather than Denmark. The more outright and domestic critics were relatively non-specialist or junior to the pro-policy experts. Finally, as in Sweden, opponents of policy were divided. The cited Swedes and the economics professor favored general vaccination, while the others favored even more limited or no vaccination.
Hence, the number, placement and status of claims suggest that print media in both countries during the 2009 pandemic presented opposition to national vaccination policies as marginal.
The major difference between Denmark and Sweden was that the dominant policy options in the respective public arenas were the opposites of one another.
Conclusions
It is now possible to answer the analytical questions posed at the outset of this paper. To There are good reasons to believe that the appearance of consensus mattered a great deal to public support. It is commonly accepted that selection and presentation of information (i.e., framing) shape how citizens think about an issue. Framing studies have shown that people who are exposed only to arguments for a given position tend to endorse it, while more balanced discussions and information can limit political manipulation and have beneficial effects for opinion formation and change (Gerber et al 2014; Chong and Druckman 2007) .
Since the citizens in the analyzed countries were exposed to frames dominated by expert consensus, past research suggests that most would have been unlikely to question them.
Although politicians may have had more information than citizens in general, the logic of blame-avoidance would have made nearly impossible a choice of a policy without strong expert backing (Weaver, 1986; Ellis, 1994; Boin, McConnell, & 'T Hart, 2008; Hood, 2011) .
Any crisis response is fraught with risks of policy failure, from doing too little, too late to doing too much, too wrong. Politicians who place themselves publicly in charge of crisis response thus run severe risks of being blamed for poor management and endangering their future electability. Using the shield of publicized expert advice and judgment enables leaders to mitigate or nullify this risk (i.e., avoid blame). Political leaders were likely to be reluctant to support a policy that deviated from the publicly apparent expert consensus.
A self-reinforcing spiral may then lock-in the policy supported by public consensus among certified experts. These government-appointed experts brief not only politicians but also journalists. In turn, citizens, based on the consistent message in media, strongly support the expert-endorsed policy option. This popular legitimation of the consensual position feeds back into the advisory and political systems, severely constraining their possibilities for considering other policy options because a change in course can threaten public faith in the officials in charge.
Deliberative freezing is predicated on actual agreement in the expert discourse or on experts adopting a unified front in public. Why may they do the latter? A clear reason is that experts can come to believe that public action is more important than public debate. This can be read conspiratorially, as an attempt by an elite group to maintain power. A less cynical reading is that the risks to the public of debate may outweigh potential rewards. A crisis can be such a situation: debate may delay action to such an extent that crisis responses occur too late to prevent catastrophic effects. This expectation may lead experts (and others) to rally to the flag by keeping their objections out of public view.
Epistemic learning and rallying to the flag in times of crisis are useful tools of governance.
The former promises evidence-based rather than interest-based policy. The latter promises timely action. When they are combined, the two factors may freeze public and private deliberation. Important implications arise from this. Governments may follow publicly expressed "advice" of certified experts, rather than taking account of alternative sources of knowledge to create a more effective or efficient national stance. This may be particularly likely when powerful actors "rally to the flag", such as during responses to crises. But deliberative freezing can lead to policies that are less effective or efficient than they could have been if experts had encouraged public deliberation.
